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Pareto Optimality and Equilibria
in Noncooperative Games
Vladislav Zhukovskiy and Konstantin Kudryavtsev
Abstract
This chapter considers the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles that are Pareto
optimal with respect to the rest of the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. The
sufficient conditions for the existence of such pure strategy profiles are established.
These conditions employ the Germeier convolutions of the payoff functions. For the
noncooperative games with compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions,
the existence of the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria (PoNE) in mixed strategies is
proven.
Keywords: Pareto optimality, Nash equilibrium, Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium,
noncooperative game, Germeier convolution
1. Introduction
In 1949, J. Nash, a Princeton University graduate at that time and a famous
American mathematician and economist as we know him today, suggested the
notion of an equilibrium solution for a noncooperative game [1] lately called “the
Nash equilibrium strategy profile.” Since then, this equilibrium is widely used in
economics, sociology, military sciences, and other spheres of human activity.
Moreover, 45 years later J. Nash, J. Harshanyi, and R. Selten were awarded the
Nobel Prize “for the pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of noncoopera-
tive games.”
However, as shown by Example 1, the set of the Nash equilibrium strategy
profiles has a negative property: there may exist two Nash equilibrium strategy
profiles such that the payoffs of each player in the first strategy profile are strictly
greater than the corresponding payoffs in the second one. In 2013, the authors
emphasized this fact in a series of papers [2, 3] while exploring the existence of a
guaranteed equilibrium solution for a noncooperative game under uncertainty.
Particularly, these papers were focused on the Nash equilibrium strategy profile
that is Pareto optimal with respect to the rest of the Nash equilibrium strategy
profiles, thereby eliminating the above shortcoming. And the following question
arises immediately. How can such an equilibrium (the so-called Pareto equilibrium
strategy profile) be found? Our idea is to use the sufficient conditions (Theorem 1)
reducing Nash equilibrium strategy profile design to saddle point calculation in a
special Germeier convolution of the payoff functions. As an application, this
chapter establishes the existence of the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium (PoNE)
strategy profile in the class of mixed strategies (see Assertion 1). Similar results
were obtained by the authors for the Pareto-optimal Berge equilibrium in [4].
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Note that two approaches can be adopted to perform formalization of the Pareto
unimprovable Nash equilibrium. According to the first approach, Pareto optimality
is required on the set of all strategy profiles in the game. The second approach
dictates to find the Pareto-optimal equilibrium on the set of all Nash equilibria.
Generally, the first approach implies construction of all Nash equilibrium strategy
profiles with subsequent check belonging to the Pareto boundary of the strategy
profile set of the game (see [5]). Numerical algorithms realizing this approach were
suggested for the bimatrix games in [5], for some two-player normal-form games in
[6] and the monograph ([7], pp. 92–93), as well as for the linear two-player posi-
tional games with cylindrical terminal payoff functions in [8]. In the case of
nonlinear differential games with convex terminal payoff functions, the publication
[9] obtained the sufficient conditions under which the unimprovable equilibrium
strategy profile on the set of Nash equilibria (the second approach) is Pareto opti-
mal on the whole strategy profile set of the game.
This chapter adheres to the second approach, suggesting an algorithm that yields
the Pareto-optimal strategy profile among all Nash equilibria.
2. Internally instable set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles
As is well known, the game theory is used in modeling interactions in econom-
ics, sociology, political science, and many other areas. Game theory is the mathe-
matical study of conflict, in which a decision-maker’s success in making choices
depends on the choice of others. In contrast to the decision-making theory, in game
theory, several decision-makers act simultaneously. These decision-makers are
called players. Their actions are called pure strategies. Each of the players seeks to
achieve their own goals that do not coincide with the goals of other players. A
measure of a player’s approach of a goal is estimated by his payoff function. The
realized value of the player’s payoff function is called his payoff. At the same time,
the player’s payoff function depends not only on his choice but also on the choice of
all other players. Therefore, when making a decision, the player is forced to focus
not only on his own interests but also on the possible actions of the other players. If
the players cannot coordinate their actions, the game is called a noncooperative
game. The basic concept of a solution in a noncooperative game theory is the Nash
equilibrium.
Consider a noncooperative game (NG) of N players in the class of pure strategies
(a non-antagonistic game)





where N ¼ 1; 2;…;Nf g is the set of players’ serial numbers; each player i chooses
and applies his own pure strategy xi ∈ Xi ⊆R
ni , forming no coalition with the others,
which induces a strategy profile x ¼ x1;…; xNð Þ∈ X ¼
Q
i∈ N Xi ⊆R
n n ¼ð n1þ
…þ nNÞ; for each i∈ N, a payoff function f i xð Þ is defined on the strategy profile set
X, which gives the payoff of player i. In addition, denote f ¼ f 1;…; fN
 
and
x zik Þ ¼ x1;…; xi1; zi; xiþ1;…; xNð Þð .




∈ X is called a Nash equilibrium




e xik Þ ¼ f i x
eð Þ i∈ Nð Þ:

(2)
The set of all xef g in game (1) will be designated by Xe.
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Now, consider internal instability of Xe. A subset X ∗ ⊆Rn is internally instable if
there exist at least two strategy profiles x jð Þ ∈ X ∗ j ¼ 1; 2ð Þ such that
f x 1ð Þ
 
, f x 1ð Þ
 h i
⇔ f i x
1ð Þ
 







Example 1. Consider a two-player NG of the form











∈ 1; 1½ 2 is a Nash equilibrium in game (4) if
x21 þ 2x1x
e
















2 ∀x1, x2 ∈ 1; 1½ ,
which is equivalent to








,  xe1  x2
 2





Therefore, we have Xe ¼ α; αð Þ ∀α∈ 1; 1½ j gf and
f i X
eð Þ ¼ ∪xe ∈ Xe f i x
eð Þ ¼ ∪α∈ 1;1½  α
2
; α
2ð Þ in game (4). Consequently, the set Xe is




¼ 0, f i x
2ð Þ
 
¼ 1 i ¼ 1; 2ð Þ (see Eq. (3)).
Note 1. In the antagonistic setting of game (1) (N ¼ 1; 2f g and f 1 xð Þ ¼ f 2 xð Þ),
the equality f 1 x
1ð Þ
 
¼ f 1 x
2ð Þ
 
holds for any two saddle points x jð Þ ∈ X j ¼ 1; 2ð Þ by
the saddle point equivalence. Hence, the saddle point set is always internally stable
in the antagonistic game. Note that a saddle point is a Nash equilibrium strategy
profile in the antagonistic setting of game (1).
Note 2. In the non-antagonistic setting of game (1), the internal instability effect
vanishes if there exist a unique Nash equilibrium strategy profile in (1).
Associate the following auxiliary N-criterion problem with game (1):
Γv ¼ X
e





where the set Xe of alternatives x coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium
strategy profiles xe in game (1) and the ith criterion f i xð Þ is the payoff function of
player i.
Definition 2. An alternative xP ∈ Xe is Pareto optimal (efficient) in problem (5)
if ∀x∈ Xe the system of inequalities








According to Definition 2, the set XP satisfies the inclusion XP ⊆Xe and is
internally stable.
The following statement is obvious: if for all x∈ Xe we have
X
i∈ N







then xP gives the Pareto-optimal alternative in problem (5).
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3. Sufficient conditions of Pareto-optimal equilibrium
Get back to game (1), associating it with the N-criterion problem (5).
Definition 3. A strategy profile x ∗ ∈ X is called a Pareto-optimal Nash equilib-
rium for game (1) if x ∗ is a Nash equilibrium in (1) (Definition 1) and a Pareto
optimum in (5) (Definition 2).
Note 3. Two classes of games where the Pareto equilibrium strategy profiles exist
in pure strategies were presented in ([7], pp. 91–92) and, in the case of differential
games, in [9–12].
Note 4. Within Example 1, we have two Pareto equilibrium strategy profiles,
namely, x ∗ ¼ 1; 1ð Þ and x ∗ ∗ ¼ 1;1ð Þ.
Based on (2) and (5), introduce N þ 1 scalar functions defined by
φi x; zð Þ ¼ f i z xikð Þ  f i zð Þ  i∈ Nð Þ,
φNþ1 x; zð Þ ¼
X
r∈ N
f r xð Þ 
X
r∈ N
f r zð Þ,
(7)
where z ¼ z1;…; zNð Þ, zi ∈ Xi i∈ Nð Þ, z∈ X, x∈ X. The Germeier convolution
([13], p. 43) of the scalar functions (7) has the form
φ x; zð Þ ¼ max
j¼1,…,Nþ1
φj x; zð Þ: (8)
In addition, associate the following antagonistic game with game (1) and the N-
criterion problem (5):
X;Z ¼ X;φ x; zð Þh i: (9)
In this game, player 1 and his opponent choose their strategies x∈ X and z∈ X to
maximize and minimize, respectively, the payoff function φ x; zð Þ described by (7)
and (8).
A saddle point xo; z ∗ð Þ∈ X2 of game (9) is defined by the chain of inequalities




∀x, z∈ X: (10)





φ x; zð Þ ¼ max
x∈ X
φ x; z ∗ð Þ
 	











The following statement defines a sufficient condition for the existence of a PoNE
strategy profile in game (1).
Theorem 1. If a saddle point xo; z ∗ð Þ exists in the antagonistic game (9) (i.e., the
condition (10) holds), then the minimax strategy z ∗ is a PoNE strategy profile for
game (1) [14].











Multicriteria Optimization - Pareto-Optimality and Threshold-Optimality
By (10), for all x∈ X it follows that
0≥ φ x; z ∗ð Þ ¼ max
j¼1,…,Nþ1
φj x; z
∗ð Þ ¼ 0:









) φj x; z







∗ xikð Þ  f j z
















∗ xikð Þ ¼ f j z
















2ð Þ, 6ð Þ
z ∗ ∈ Xe½ ∧ z ∗ ∈ XP
  
:
This chain involves the inclusion Xe ⊆X: □
Remark 1. Theorem 1 substantiates the following design method of the PoNE
strategy profile x ∗ in game (1).
Step 1. Using the payoff functions f i xð Þ i∈ Nð Þ from (1) and the vectors
z ¼ z1;…; zNð Þ, zi ∈ Xi and x ¼ x1;…; xNð Þ, xi ∈ Xi i∈ Nð Þ, construct the
functionφ x; zð Þ by formulas (7) and (8).
Step 2. Find the saddle point xo; ; z ∗ð Þ of antagonistic game (9). Then z ∗ is the
Pareto equilibrium solution of game (1).
As far as the authors know, numerical calculation methods of the saddle
point xo; z ∗ð Þ for the Germeier convolution
φ x; zð Þ ¼ max
j¼1,…,Nþ1
φj x; zð Þ
have not been developed yet. However, they are vital to construct the Nash
equilibrium strategy profiles that are Pareto optimal (see Theorem 1). This is a new
trend in equilibrium programming; in the authors’ opinion, it can be developed
using the mathematical apparatus of Germeier convolution optimization maxj φj xð Þ
proposed by Dem’yanov [15].
Remark 2. The results of operations research ([16], p. 54) yield the following
statement that is crucial to prove the existence of a PoNE strategy profile in the class
of mixed strategies in game (1) (see the forthcoming section). If Xi ∈ compR
ni and
f i ð Þ∈ C Xð Þ i∈ Nð Þ in game (1), then the Germeier convolution φ x; zð Þ ¼
maxj¼1,…,Nþ1 φj x; zð Þ from (7) and (8) is continuous on X  X.
4. Existence of PoNE strategy profile in mixed strategies
That game (1) admits a PoNE strategy profile in the class of pure strategies (see
Definition 3) is rather a miracle. This equilibrium may exist only for special payoff
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functions, strategy sets, and numbers of players. Therefore, adhering to the
approach associated with E. Borel [17], J. von Neumann [18], Nash [1], and their
followers, we establish the existence of the PoNE strategy profile of game (1) in the
class of mixed strategies under standard game theory restrictions (i.e., compact
strategy sets and continuous payoff functions).
And so, suppose that in game (1) the sets Xi of the pure strategies xi are compact
sets in Rni (are closed and bounded), whereas the payoff function f i xð Þ of each
player i i∈ Nð Þ is continuous on the set of pure strategy profiles X.
Consider the mixed strategy extension of game (1). To this end, construct the Borel
σ-algebra B Xið Þ on each compact set Xi i∈ Nð Þ and probability measures νi ð Þ on
B Xið Þ (i.e., nonnegative scalar functions defined on the elements of B Xið Þ that are
countably additive and normalized to unity on Xi). Denote by νif g the whole set of
such measures; the measure νi ð Þ proper is called the mixed strategy of player i i∈ Nð Þ
in game (1). Next, for game (1) construct the mixed strategy profiles, that is, the
multiplicative measures
ν dxð Þ ¼ ν1 dx1ð Þ…νN dxNð Þ,
and designate by νf g the set of such strategy profiles. And finally, find the
mathematical expectations
f i νð Þ ¼
ð
X
f i xð Þν dxð Þ  i∈ Nð Þ: (11)
As a result, the game Γ from (1) is associated with its mixed strategy extension





In the noncooperative game ~Γ, we have the following elements:
νi ð Þ∈ νif g as the mixed strategy of player i.
ν ð Þ∈ νf g as the mixed strategy profile.
f i νð Þ as the payoff function of player i defined by (11).
Further exposition involves the vector z ¼ z1;…; zNð Þ∈ X with zi ∈ Xi i∈ Nð Þ,
and, of course, the vector x ¼ x1;…; xNð Þ∈ X, as well as the mixed strategy profiles
ν ð Þ, μ ð Þ∈ νf g and the mathematical expectations
f i νð Þ ¼
ð
X
f i xð Þν dxð Þ, f i μð Þ ¼
ð
X
f i zð Þμ dzð Þ,













f i xð ÞμN dzNð Þ…
…μiþ1 dziþ1ð Þνi dxið Þμi1 dzi1ð Þ…μ1 dz1ð Þ:
(12)
Once again, we underline that xi, zi ∈ Xi i∈ Nð Þ and x, z∈ X.
The following notion of the Nash equilibrium strategy profile ν e ð Þ∈ νf g in
mixed strategies in original game (1) answers to Definition 1 of the Nash equilib-
rium strategy profile xe ∈ X in pure strategies in the same game (1).




νik Þ≤ f i ν
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throughout the paper, ν e ð Þ∈ νf g will be also called the Nash equilibrium strat-
egy profile in mixed strategies for game (1).
By the Glicksberg theorem [19], there exists a Nash equilibrium strategy profile
in mixed strategies in game (1) under Xi ∈ compR
ni and f i ð Þ∈ C Xð Þ i∈ Nð Þ. Denote
by N the set of such profiles ν ef g.
Associate the following N-criterion problem with the game ~Γ
~Γ
υ





In (14), a decision-maker chooses a strategy profile ν ð Þ∈ N to simultaneously
maximize all components of the vector criterion f νð Þ ¼ f 1 νð Þ;…; fN νð Þ
 
. The notion
of the Pareto optimal strategy profile is conventional (see below).
Definition 5. A strategy profile νP ð Þ∈ N is called Pareto optimal for the
N-criterion problem ~Γ
υ
from (14) if for any ν ð Þ∈ N the system of inequalities
f i νð Þ≥ f i ν
P
 
  i∈ Nð Þ
is infeasible, with at least one inequality being strict.
The following statement represents an analog of (6): if for all ν ð Þ∈ N we have
X
i∈ N







then the mixed strategy profile νP ð Þ∈ N is Pareto optimal in the problem ~Γ
υ
from (14).
Combining Definition 4 with Definition 5 leads to.
Definition 6. A strategy profile ν ∗ ð Þ∈ νf g is called a Pareto-optimal Nash
equilibrium strategy profile in mixed strategies for game (1) if ν ∗ ð Þ is a Nash
equilibrium in ~Γ (according to Definition 4), and ν ∗ ð Þ is Pareto optimal in the
multicriterion problem ~Γ
υ
(according to Definition 5).
Now, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium strategy profile in mixed
strategies that is Pareto optimal with respect to the rest Nash equilibrium strategy
profiles.
Assertion 1. Consider the noncooperative game (1) where:
1. The pure strategy set Xi of each player i is a nonempty compact set in R
ni
i∈ Nð Þ.
2. The payoff function f i xð Þ of player i i∈ Nð Þ is continuous on the strategy
profile set X.
Then there exists a PoNE strategy profile in mixed strategies in game (1).
Proof. Using formulas (7) and (8), construct the scalar function
φ x; zð Þ ¼ max
j¼1,…,Nþ1
φj x; zð Þ,
where
φi x; zð Þ ¼ f i z xikð Þ  f i zð Þ i∈ Nð Þ,
φNþ1 x; zð Þ ¼
X
r∈ N
f r xð Þ 
X
r∈ N
f r zð Þ,
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According to the construction procedure and Remark 2, the function φ x; zð Þ is
defined and continuous on the product of compact sets X  X.
Define the auxiliary antagonistic game
Γa ¼ I; IIf g;X;Z ¼ X;φ x; zð Þh i,
where players I and II seek to maximize and minimize, respectively, the function
φ x; zð Þ continuous on X  Z Z ¼ Xð Þ by choosing their strategies x∈ X and z∈ X.
Now, apply a special case of the Glicksberg theorem [19] to the game Γa, as the
saddle point in this game coincides with the Nash equilibrium strategy profile in the
two-player noncooperative game
Γ2 ¼ I; IIf g; X;Z ¼ Xf g; f I x; zð Þ ¼ φ x; zð Þ; f II x; zð Þ ¼ φ x; zð Þ
  
:
In this game, player I seeks to maximize f I x; zð Þ ¼ φ x; zð Þ by choosing his strat-
egy x∈ X, whereas player II tries to maximize f II x; zð Þ ¼ φ x; zð Þ The sets X and
X ¼ Z in game Γ2 are compact, while the payoff functions f I x; zð Þ and f II x; zð Þ are
continuous on X  Z; hence, by the Glicksberg theorem, there exists a Nash equi-
librium strategy profile ν e; μ ∗ð Þ in the mixed extension Γ2:















In addition, ν e; μ ∗ð Þ is simultaneously a saddle point of the mixed extension of
the game Γa :





φ x; zð Þν dxð Þμ dzð Þ
* +
:
Thus, according to the Glicksberg theorem, there exists a pair ν e; μ ∗ð Þ
representing a saddle point of φ ν; μð Þ, that is,
φ ν; μ
∗ð Þ≤φ ν e; μ ∗ð Þ≤φ ν e; μð Þ, ∀ν ð Þ, μ ð Þ∈ νf g: (16)
Letting μ ¼ ν e in the right inequality of (16) gives φ ν e; ν eð Þ ¼ 0 and so,
∀ν ð Þ∈ νf g formula (16) implies







φj x; zð Þν dxð Þμ
∗ dzð Þ: (17)














φj x; zð Þν dxð Þμ dzð Þ: (18)
Note that this property has an analog: the maximum of the sum of functions does







φj x; zð Þν dxð Þμ
∗ dzð Þ≤0 ∀ν ð Þ∈ νf g,
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φj x; zð Þν dxð Þμ
∗ dzð Þ≤0 ∀ν ð Þ∈ νf g: (19)
Next, taking into account the normalized mixed strategies and the normalized
mixed strategy profiles, that is, the conditions
ð
X
νi dxið Þ ¼ 1,
ð
X
μi dzið Þ ¼ 1 i∈ Nð Þ,
ð
X
ν dxð Þ ¼ 1,
ð
X
μ dzð Þ ¼ 1 (20)
that hold ∀νi ð Þ∈ νif g, μi ð Þ∈ μif g, ν ð Þ∈ νf g, μ ð Þ∈ μf g, we distinguish between
two cases, namely, j∈ N and j ¼ N þ 1. For each of these cases, it is necessary to
refine inequalities (19).






f i z xikð Þ  f i zð Þ
 





f i z xikð Þ  f i zð Þ
 
νi dxið Þμ






f i z xikð Þνi dxið Þμ
∗ dzð Þ 
ð
X




νi dxið Þ ¼
12ð Þ, 20ð Þ
¼

























 f i μ
∗ð Þ ¼
¼ f i μ
∗
νikð Þ  f i μ
∗ð Þ≤0 ∀νi ð Þ∈ νif g:
In combination with (13), this result gives the inclusion μ ∗ ð Þ∈ N, that is, the
mixed strategy profile μ ∗ ð Þ is a Nash equilibrium for the game (1) by Definition 4.














f i xð Þν dxð Þμ







f i xð Þν dxð Þμ































f i zð Þμ
∗ dzð Þ ¼
12ð ÞX
i∈ N




∗ð Þ≤0 ∀ν ð Þ∈ N,
in as much as N⊆ νf g. This immediately yields (15) for νP ¼ μ ∗ , that is, the




This outcome and the inclusion μ ∗ ð Þ∈ N conclude the proof. □
Note 5. Another proof of Assertion 1 can be found in ([3], pp. 13–15).
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5. Conclusions
Vorob’ev, the founder of game theory in Russia, believed that its subject [20] is
answering the following three questions:
1.What is the optimality of a given game?
2.Does an optimal solution exist?
3.How can it be found?
For the many-player noncooperative games, the answer to the first question is
the PoNE strategy profile.
The answer to the second question is given by Assertion 1: if the strategy sets are
compact and the payoff functions are continuous, then a Pareto equilibrium strat-
egy profile exists in the class of mixed strategies.
As turned out, the answer to the third question is not so simple. At first glance,
one should just construct the Germeier convolution of the payoff functions using
formulas (7) and (8) and find the saddle point (10); then the minimax strategy
entering the saddle point is the PoNE strategy profile. This equilibrium design
method is dictated by Theorem 1, actually being the basic result of the present
paper. However, the issues of saddle point construction for the Germeier convolu-
tions have not been developed so far. The usage of specific numerical algorithms
and their complexity still remain under investigated. Further research by the
authors and, hopefully, by the readers will endeavor to improve the situation.
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